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Christine M. Buzzardt
The Third Circuit recently held that the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act (FTAIA) creates a substantive element of a plaintiffs claim
for extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws rather than a
jurisdictional limitation. This Comment argues that, while a substantive
interpretation imposes additional costs on all litigating parties, for claims
arising under statutes addressing overseas conduct, the challenges that
plaintiffs face in international discovery greatly exceed those of defendants.
Blocking statutes enacted by many nations prevent FTAIA plaintiffs from
efficiently attaining litigation materials. This Comment flags these problems,
notes their implications beyond the FTAIA, and outlines potential reforms.
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Introduction
In August 2011, the Third Circuit's Animal Science Products, Inc. v.
China Minmetals Corp.1 decision reversed its own circuit precedent to hold that
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected, 2013; University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of
Business, B.S.E., 2010; University of Pennsylvania, College of Arts and Sciences, B.A., 2010. My
thanks to Noah Messing for his thoughtful guidance on this project; to Ryan Watzel and the Yale
Journal on Regulation for excellent edits on this Comment; to George Priest and Daryl Libow for
sharing their insights; and to Danielle Rosenthal for helpful feedback on earlier drafts. All errors are my
own.
1. 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
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the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA) creates a substantive,
rather than jurisdictional, bound on the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws. The distinction, according to recent Supreme Court precedent, is
fundamental. When a fact-here a substantial effect of overseas antitrust
violations on American commerce-is characterized as substantive, a failure to
prove that fact indicates that the plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the
particular law at issue. When a fact is jurisdictional, however, its absence
completely deprives the court of the power to resolve the dispute between the
parties.
The Animal Science ruling augurs consequences for plaintiffs seeking
overseas discovery to substantiate their claims. Many foreign nations have
adopted "blocking" statutes-statutes that protect countries' respective
domestic corporations from the reach of foreign laws-that make it
extraordinarily difficult for American plaintiffs to obtain documents and
depositions from foreign entities. Litigants, therefore, may find themselves
without the ability to even establish their claims to the degree necessary to
initiate earnest settlement discussions. Plaintiffs' difficulties in international
discovery, a necessary form of pretrial inquiry for claims arising under the
FTAIA's uniquely foreign-focused subject matter, greatly outweigh the
traditional discovery and litigation costs befalling defendants. A similar effect
will likely occur for other statutory regimes governing foreign conduct and its
effects on the United States.
This Comment seeks to explain the legal foundation for the Third
Circuit's ruling and why its approach hobbles antitrust enforcement affecting
U.S. imports. The piece also sketches some intermediate solutions to help
antitrust plaintiffs overcome the impairments stemming from Animal Science-
at least until and unless the Supreme Court restores the traditional jurisdictional
approach to the FTAIA's provisions.
In Part I, I introduce the FTAIA. The Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding a statute's jurisdictional or substantive character appears in Part II.
Then, Part III explains the Third Circuit's Animal Science opinion and Part IV
emphasizes the consequences of applying a substantive reading to the FTAIA. I
explain the international discovery regime and the phenomenon of blocking
statutes in Part V, and Part VI sketches some potential solutions.
I. The Foreign Application of U.S. Antitrust Law
Foreign application of U.S. antitrust law is nothing new. 2 The Sherman
Act itself extends to contracts, combinations, or conspiracies "in restraint of
2. For a general defense of the application of American antitrust laws against foreign
defendants, see John H. Shenefield, The Perspective ofthe U.S. Department ofJustice, in PERSPECTIVES





trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations" and
prohibits monopolization of a similar character.3 Jurisprudence in this area
increasingly has looked overseas, culminating in Judge Learned Hand's
"effects" test in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),4 which
determined whether substantive U.S. antitrust law should apply to foreign
defendant corporations or foreign plaintiff groups.' There, the Second Circuit
held that American antitrust law applies to uniquely American injuries:
extraterritorial acts must be "intended to affect imports [entering the United
States] and [must actually] affect them." 6 The Supreme Court has actively cited
the Alcoa effects test for this proposition, most recently in 2004.7
Congress incorporated Judge Hand's ideas in the 1982 FTAIA.8 The
enactment created a new Sherman Act section 7, which enumerated twin
exceptions to the general rule of limited suits: suits are available for activities
(i) that "ha[ve] a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
United States commerce;9 and (ii) where the statutory effect "gives rise to a
claim" under antitrust law. 1 Notably, these sections do not create an alternative
substantive offense, but rather they serve as an elemental prerequisite to any
suit against foreign defendants under the existing U.S. antitrust laws."
In the immediately following years, the circuits divided on multiple
dimensions of FTAIA application.12 But the courts did have one thing in
common: they had all read the statute as a jurisdictional prerequisite to an
antitrust claim.'3
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006) (emphasis added).
4. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). For an earlier analysis, effectively overruled by Alcoa, see
American Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
5. In the Alcoa case, Judge Hand sat on a court of last resort where "a quorum of six [Supreme
Court] justices qualified to hear the case was wanting." Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 421; see 15 U.S.C. § 29
(1946) (recodified at 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006) (authorizing lower courts to hear cases where the
Supreme Court lacks a quorum)). Judge Hand's opinion is widely respected and today enjoys authority
akin to a Supreme Court precedent. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 781, 811 (1946)
(acknowledging the unique circumstances in Alcoa and commenting that those circumstances "add to its
weight as precedent").
6. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
7. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004).
8. Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12,
15, and 30 U.S.C.).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006).
10. Id. This test may be applied to instances where the effect is merely intended as well as
where a party both intended to have and did have an anticompetitive effect. See LB PHILLIP E. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 280 (3d ed. 2006).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) ("[S]uch effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections I to
7 of this title, other than this section.").
12. See Deborah J. Buswell, Note, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: A Three Ring
Circus-Three Circuits, Three Interpretations, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979 (2003) (explaining that the Fifth
Circuit adopted a restrictive, defendant-friendly view of the statute's application to foreign conduct,
while the Second Circuit took a far more expansive approach; the D.C. Circuit opted for a middle path).
13. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 296 (citing cases).
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II. Supreme Encouragement: Substantive Readings of Federal Statutes
Federal courts enjoy only limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, statutes that
confer federal powers of review are the subject of much litigation-a lack of
jurisdiction not only allows the defendant to prevail, but it also insulates him
from the costs of even litigating the issue. 14 A substantive element of a claim,
however, does not provide an immediate and complete bar to suit. Instead, it
establishes an additional component of an offense that plaintiffs must show
through relevant and admissible evidence-evidence often obtained in
discovery.
The Supreme Court began to distinguish earnestly between substantive
and jurisdictional claims in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.15 The Arbaugh opinion
asserted that the case "concern[ed] the distinction between two sometimes
confused or conflated concepts: federal-court 'subject-matter' jurisdiction over
a controversy; and the essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief.""
These two categories later became known as jurisdictional and substantive
claims, respectively. The Arbaugh Court also critically described the
"profligate" and "less than meticulous"' 7 invocations of "jurisdiction" in lower
courts and chastised itself for continuing the trend of imprecise language.' 8 The
Court emphasized the importance of seriously and thoroughly considering a
law's jurisdictional or substantive effect, avoiding what it dubbed "drive-by
jurisdictional rulings." 9 Since Arbaugh, the Supreme Court has imposed
substantive constructions on many,20 but not all,2 1 provisions previously
thought to announce jurisdictional limitations.
14. Generally, claims unavailable in the federal courts may be brought in state courts of
general jurisdiction; however, the FTAIA is commonly considered the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts. See Daniel Wotherspoon, The "Element" of Surprise: The Third Circuit Bucks the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act Trend in Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals
Corp., 57 VILL. L. REV. 785, 804 & n.155 (2012) (noting that a jurisdictional approach would cause
plaintiffs to experiment with litigation in state courts and to attempt creative arguments that may avoid
removal to federal tribunals).
15. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
16. Id. at 503.
17. Id.at510-ll.
18. Id. at 510.
19. Id. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).
20. The most recent manifestation of this jurisprudential evolution occurred in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), where the Court's choice to adopt a substantive
application of a securities statute abrogated a litany of case law. See id. at 2878-81.
21. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 130 S. Ct. 584,597 (2009)
(citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-11 (2007)) ("In contrast, relying on a long line of this
Court's decisions left undisturbed by Congress, we have reaffirmed the jurisdictional character of the
time limitation for filing a notice of appeal stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)."); see also John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132 (2008) (explaining that a court must consider sua sponte




Legal scholarship was largely welcoming of this newfound distinction
between sources of Congress's constitutional power. 22 The analysis proceeds
from a simple proposition: "[a]bsent a congressional exercise of . . .
jurisdiction-defining power, the federal courts are presumed to be closed to a
particular case."23 The problem presented in Arbaugh, however, relates to
situations where Congress's enacted text lacks a clear invocation of power or
where precedent presumes its exercise. The Arbaugh opinion, along with
subsequent scholarship, does not move beyond the separation-of-powers, good
government approach to the substantive/jurisdictional divide.24 This Comment
does not take issue with this approach in the abstract; the questions of federal
jurisdiction addressed in Arbaugh and related scholarship are interesting and
important theoretical matters, and certainly any reviewing court must seriously
consider congressional text. Any method of interpretive theory, however, must
take into account the practical realities of its applications, even if only to find
that constitutional necessity outweighs countervailing concerns.2 This is
especially true in the context of international litigation, where the courts'
reasoning may prevent litigation from surviving even a motion to dismiss. In
such situations, the constitutional discussion commands a more nuanced
approach; it must address the newfound inability of plaintiffs to air their claims
in a meaningful way before federal courts. Perhaps the confusion will force
Congress to speak more clearly in its intentions, but until then, courts will
continue to grapple with these interpretive questions.
III. The Third Circuit's Animal Science Perspective
In 2005, Animal Science, an American company, sued its Chinese
supplier of magnesite, alleging that it had violated the Sherman Act by
engaging in a conspiracy to fix the price of magnesite exported for sale into the
22. See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction & Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643
(2005) (describing the error associated with drive-by jurisdictional rulings). Long before the Arbaugh
decision, the restators of foreign relations law shared this point of view. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 & cmt. a (1987).
23. Stephen R. Brown, Hearing Congress's Jurisdictional Speech: Giving Meaning to the
"Clearly-States" Test in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 46 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 33, 34 (2009).
24. Scott Dodson, The Complexity ofJurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 36-39 (2011)
(describing the jurisdictional characterization of statutes and discussing the lack of clear jurisdictional
bars); Eamonn O'Hagan, Stop Changing the Subject! Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether
Statutory Requirements Are Subject Matter Jurisdictional or Claims Processing Rules, 20 J. BANKR. L.
& PRAC. 53 (2011) (explaining strategies for advocating dismissal of bankruptcy actions on
jurisdictional grounds under the Supreme Court's recent decisions); Howard M. Wasserman, The
Demise of "Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings," 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 184, 186-89 (2011)
(reviewing cases where the Court has scrutinized jurisdiction).
25. See generally Edward Valdespino, Shifting Viewpoints: The Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act, A Substantive or Jurisdictional Approach, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 457 (2009) (beginning
the conversation about the practical consequences of a substantive approach to the FTAIA).
26. A metal "used, among other things, to melt steel, make cement, and clean wastewater."
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462,464 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011).
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United States.2 7 While the defendants did not argue that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to resolve foreign antitrust violations, the judge raised the issue sua
sponte,28 dismissing on jurisdictional grounds.2 9
The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the FTAIA is
viewed most properly as a substantive limitation-an element of the antitrust
violation, rather than a limit on subject matter jurisdiction.30 The court asserted
that it must "determine whether, in enacting the FTAIA, Congress legislated
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority to articulate substantive elements
that a plaintiff must satisfy to assert a meritorious claim for antitrust relief or
whether Congress acted pursuant to its Article III powers to define the
jurisdiction of the federal courts." 31 The court's reasoning on this point
stemmed from an analysis of congressional powers; it distinguished "the
constitutional authority to set forth the elements of a successful claim for relief
and the constitutional authority to delineate the subject matter jurisdiction of
the lower courts." 32 The Third Circuit scrutinized the statutory language to find
that the text failed to address the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 3 3 Therefore,
according to the court, the statute presented a substantive merits element, and
Congress had enacted the law under its "Commerce Clause authority to
delineate the elements of a successful antitrust claim rather than its Article III
authority to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts."34
IV. Shifting Costs Under the Animal Science Interpretation
The seemingly innocuous distinction between jurisdictional and
substantive readings of the FTAIA has substantial effects on parties' need for
foreign discovery. While costs associated with a substantive approach to purely
domestic disputes would fall relatively equally on all parties, in the context of
27. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320, 329 (D.N.J.
2010).
28. Id. at 330-31.
29. Id. at 464.
30. Animal Science, 654 F.3d at 471.
31. Id. at 467.
32. Id. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-20 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing between the two, naming them "legislative jurisdiction" and "judicial
jurisdiction," respectively).
33. Animal Science, 654 F.3d at 468 ("The FTAIA neither speaks in jurisdictional terms nor
refers in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.").
34. Id. at 469 (emphasis added). A panel of Seventh Circuit judges had previously disagreed
with this interpretation, finding that the FTAIA presented a jurisdictional bar to suit based on comity
analysis. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 322 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The
Sherman Act, tracking, as it does, the Commerce Clause, is well within legislative jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, principles of international comity dictate how a statute will be interpreted . . . ."). A
subsequent en banc panel of the Seventh Circuit, however, overruled the panel decision, employing
reasoning parallel to that of the Third Circuit in Animal Science. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683




an FTAIA suit defendants' costs are tremendously outweighed by plaintiffs'
increased difficulties in obtaining discovery from foreign nationals.
For defendants, the Animal Science decision, and the substantive FTAIA
interpretation it urges, extends obligations beyond an initial, rote motion to
dismiss. If courts no longer remove antitrust cases on simple pretrial motions
raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction-motions typically handled with
dispatch-defendants will be forced to resort to backstops: either they could
engage with the facts of the case and allege plaintiffs' failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6),35 or they could take the
more costly route and continue directly to discovery. Under either scenario,
defendants would certainly incur charges from additional attorney hours and
expenses.36 The argument of increased costs to defendants constitutes an oft-
repeated refrain, and these expenditures are certainly meaningful and necessary
for individuals and corporations with substantial U.S. contacts." But the
FTAIA aims at a very different type of defendant--one that resides overseas
and may retreat easily from the reach of the American legal system.
The real problematic effect of a substantive reading is its frustration of
plaintifs' attempts to litigate against foreign individuals and corporations. It
adds another claim that plaintiffs must prove through discovery, rather than an
issue the judge decides at an early stage. Additionally, the removal of an
opportunity for Rule 12(b)( 1)38 disposition rescinds the occasion for settlement
negotiation that plaintiffs surviving that motion traditionally enjoy.39 These
factors, coupled with an inability to unearth key evidence held overseas, could
result in tremendous under-enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws, even for would-
be-meritorious claims. Judges conducting an Arbaugh analysis should,
therefore, consider the sizable practical ramifications of converting
jurisdictional bars to suit into substantive provisions in claims typically asserted
against foreign defendants. A short overview of international discovery hurdles
appears below.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
36. See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431, 450
(2008) (discussing the effects of Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)) ("In effect, then, the
Court has moved forward the burden that plaintiffs must carry at later stages in the litigation up front to
the pleading stage.").
37. See Eric O'Connor, Prevailing Antitrust Defendants Recover $367,000 in e-Discovery
Costs, ANTrTRUST L. BLOG (May 24, 2011), http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/2011/05/
articles/article/prevailing-antitrust-defendants-recover-367000-in-ediscovery-costs (claiming that e-
discovery alone, not including attorneys' fees and other costs, can often "run several hundred thousand
dollars or more" for antitrust defendants).
38. FED. R. CIv.P. 12(b)(1).
39. See, e.g., Mark Thomas Smith, Strategic Motions To Dismiss (or Lack Thereofi, ABA
LITIGATION NEws, http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial skills/pretrial-motion-
dismiss.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (discussing the signaling opportunities available at the motion
to dismiss stage and their effects on settlement negotiations).
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V. International Discovery and Foreign Impediments
The real impact of the Third Circuit's rule obtains for those plaintiffs who
seek to pursue FTAIA actions against countries with "blocking statutes"-
provisions that take advantage of loopholes in international agreements to hide
their citizens from foreign discovery requests. The statutes take a variety of
forms, typically imposing criminal sanctions on persons and corporations
within the enacting state who comply with a foreign court's discovery
request. 40 Outside the enacting state, the blocking statutes operate to frustrate
those seeking testimony and documents necessary to support their legal claims.
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters41 was originally adopted in 1968 to "facilitate the
transmission and execution of [discovery requests] and to further the
accommodation of the different methods which [countries] use for this
purpose" as well as to "improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or
commercial matters." 4 2 The treaty now boasts fifty-seven contracting states,
among them most of the major western trading nations.43 Decades after the
treaty's signing, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the purpose of the Hague
Convention was to "establish a system for obtaining evidence located abroad
that would be 'tolerable' to the state executing the request and would produce
evidence 'utilizable' in the requesting state.""
Any U.S. litigant seeking to obtain evidence for use in a judicial
proceeding under the Hague Convention can proceed through one of three
routes: "Letters of Request,"45 diplomatic or consular officers, or appointed
commissioners. Each of these paths involves complicated procedures that add
substantial delay to the discovery process. 46 Yet even if these procedures
functioned flawlessly, Article XXIII of the Hague Convention provides a
substantial escape clause that allows member states to assert that they "will not
execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial
40. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 751-
52 (2009).
41. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
42. Id. at pmbl. Note that this provision does not apply to criminal investigations, and it may
not even extend to other areas of American law such as tax. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
OBTAINING DISCOVERY ABROAD 27 (2d ed. 2005).
43. Status Table of 20: Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, http://www.hcch.net/
indexen.php?act-conventions.status&cid=82 (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
44. Soci6td Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 530-31 (1987).
45. These are also referred to as "Letters of Rogatory."
46. See Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L.




discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries."47 Laws enacted
to exploit this provision are "blocking statutes," and they represent a large
impediment to discovery collection overseas.
Many foreign countries have blocking statutes in place. These provisions
reflect the hostility between different judicial systems, particularly the
dissimilarities between American style pretrial procedures and those of a civil
law system.48 However, even in countries without a civil law tradition, self-
interest often results in blocking statutes that protect countries' respective
domestic entities from the reach of U.S. antitrust laws.49
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Socidtd Nationale
Industrielle Adrospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa50 certified as "well settled" the proposition that blocking statutes "do not
deprive an American court of the power to order a party subject to its
jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the act of production may violate
that statute."51 Blocking statutes' criminal enforcement provisions, however,
prevent foreign citizens from complying with such an order. Additionally, a
foreign nation may refuse to enforce a judgment obtained through evidence
found within their borders if the Hague Convention's procedures are not
followed, thus shielding citizens from sanctions a U.S. court may impose for
failure to comply with discovery requests.52 Currently, fifteen countries have
established blocking statutes;53 these laws are particularly influential because
"[i]n general, foreign nondisclosure regulations of all types are enforced by
criminal penalties" that apply to Americans who seek discovery on foreign
47. Hague Convention, supra note 41, at 2568. The hurdles associated with consular officers
and appointed commissioners are similarly high. Diplomatic officers may not compel production, they
are restricted to deposition and not document evidence, and nation states have the prerogative to require
that agents ask the permission of the relevant foreign host state before taking a deposition. Id. at 25 64-
65. An appointed commissioner may only depose cooperative witnesses, and only with the host nation's
consent. Id. at 2565-66; see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRusT LAW, supra note 42, at 38-39 (describing
the procedures).
48. In civil law jurisdictions, the discovery process is conducted by a judge, the sole
investigator of the facts. The skepticism toward parties inherent in this system may explain some of the
mistrust of American-style discovery. See David Brewer, Obtaining Discovery Abroad: The Utility of
the Comity Analysis in Determining Whether To Order Production ofDocuments Protected by Foreign
Blocking Statutes, 22 HOus. J. INT'L L. 525, 528 (2000).
49. See David E. Teitelbaum, Strict Enforcement of Extraterritorial Discovery, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 841, 846-48 (1986).
50. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
51. Id. at 544 n.29.
52. J. Joseph Tanner, International Discovery: Around the World in Ninety Minutes, 2008
A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 34, available at http://mcmillan.ca/Files/BHarrisonAroundtheWorldinNinety
Minutes.pdf.
53. David W. Ogden & Sarah G. Rapawy, Discovery in Transnational Litigation: Procedures
and Procedural Issues, 2007 A.B.A. BUS. L. SEC. 19, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/
newsletter/0058/materials/ppl.pdf ("Approximately 15 countries have enacted blocking statutes or
adopted measures to prevent the extraterritorial application of U.S. discovery procedures against foreign
persons."). Countries employing these statutes include Australia, Canada, China, France, and the United
Kingdom. See Note, Reassessment of International Application of Antitrust Laws: Blocking Statutes,
Balancing Tests, and Treble Damages, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1987).
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soil.54 Litigants are unlikely to trifle with these harsh consequences in order to
pursue a civil suit.
To fully understand the power behind these statutes, take the Chinese
statute that Animal Science faces. Article 263 of China's Civil Procedure Law
provides that "no foreign agency or individual may, without the consent of the
competent authorities of the People's Republic of China, serve documents,
carry out an investigation or take evidence within the territory of the People's
Republic of China."" These provisions are so strict that the U.S. Department of
State warned American citizens seeking evidence from within China's borders
that their actions could subject them to "detention and/or arrest."56 The State
Department went on to explain the delays associated with successful discovery
through Chinese channels: "Requests may take more than a year to execute. It
is not unusual for no reply to be received or [received only] after considerable
time has elapsed, [or] for Chinese authorities to request clarification from the
American court with no indication that the request will eventually be
executed."57
As the Chinese example illustrates, litigants facing blocking statutes are
stopped in their tracks. These impediments provide a tremendous frustration to
parties who cannot resolve even initial questions-those previously thought
jurisdictional-prior to expending efforts in discovery.
VI. Potential Paths Toward Reform
No discussion of this topic is complete without a nod to various options
available to those inclined towards reform.
First, one could imagine the ambitious step of amending the Hague
Convention to prevent blocking statutes and ensure an efficacious discovery
system for litigants around the globe. Such a solution, however, is unlikely to
come to fruition in the foreseeable future-sovereign nations are unlikely to
give away today what they insisted on retaining forty years ago.
A more realistic approach encourages judges to develop a heightened
awareness of the difficulties plaintiffs face in international discovery. The
Socidtd Nationale opinion nicely depicts the current problem: American
judges believe that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a one-size-fits-
all solution, reasonably and equally effective for all litigants. Sensitizing judges
to the obstacles in international discovery could ameliorate the disadvantages of
applying a substantive interpretation to legal claims provable only with
54. Teitelbaum, supra note 49, at 849.
55. Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Order No. 44 of
the President of the People's Republic of China, April 9, 1991), art. 263, available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/ 207339.htm.
56. Tanner, supra note 52, at 35.
57. Id.




evidence held overseas. This awareness could result in a new substantive
cannon of statutory construction, one that requires a clear statement to apply a
non-jurisdictional restriction for statutes seeking to regulate foreign conduct.
In enacting a law with overseas application, like the FTAIA, Congress likely
meant to regulate that conduct in an efficient manner, a manner sufficient not
only to redress wrongs but also to deter them from occurring. The Third
Circuit's current method of statutory construction obstructs that purpose.
Another potential stopgap uniquely suits trial courts. There, judges
attempting to preside over lawsuits reaching foreign conduct could adopt a
judicial inference adverse to a foreign party evading their discovery requests; if
a defendant invokes a blocking statute, the judge could assume that alleged
adverse facts appear in the undiscoverable materials and rule accordingly. This
option would mimic the procedures currently employed where a party fails to
comply with ordinary discovery requests,6 and it could mitigate the
consequences of circuit court opinions requiring a substantive interpretation of
the FTAIA or similar statutes.
Ultimately, however, the option of statutory change may prove optimal.
Rather than requiring judges to behave in an overly realist manner to shift their
jurisprudence over time, reform could consist of an amendment to the Sherman
Act clarifying that the FTAIA provides a jurisdictional, rather than substantive,
bar to suit. Such a statute would swiftly clarify the law in this area without the
cost and uncertainty otherwise plaguing future lawsuits.
VII. Conclusion
A substantive interpretation of the FTAIA, following the Third Circuit's
application of Arbaugh in Animal Science, will likely allow more claims to
proceed to the point where foreign blocking statutes will prevent plaintiffs from
proving their case and obtaining a final judgment. This inability of would-be-
prevailing plaintiffs to obtain compensation discourages future private
enforcement and leaves key American statutes under-enforced. Given the high
volume of foreign imports entering American markets from countries with
robust blocking statutes, judges and policymakers interpreting foreign-looking
statutes like the FTAIA should no longer remain blind to the tremendous
difficulties associated with discovery activities under the Hague Convention.
American law will need to address these problems in order to restore the
FTAIA's promise of redress for American injuries perpetrated by overseas
entities.
59. This approach has coalesced in the federalism canon, which requires that if Congress
wants to "upset" the "usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers," it must clearly state its
intention to do so within the statute. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991).
60. See FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i); see also SB CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2289 n.19 (3d ed. 2002) (citing cases).
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